Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice by Binder, Rudolf F.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1968
Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice
Rudolf F. Binder
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons, and the Torts Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rudolf F. Binder, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice, 17 Clev.-Marshall L. Rev. 218 (1968)
Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice
Rudolf F. Binder*
T HE "CLOAK OF PROTECTION encompassing the physician in the practice
of his profession" is no longer to be taken for granted.' Recent
decisions in Alaska,2 California,3 Louisiana,4 Oregon, 5 and Wisconsin6
have swept aside the traditional limitations in the use of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine. They impose all but strict liability upon the medical
profession for mistakes occurring during treatment or surgery.
The phrase res ipsa loquitur was first used in England in 1863.7 It
soon was developed into a doctrine of circumstantial evidence and found
entrance into American law.8 Usually four conditions are stated for the
application of res ipsa loquitur: (1) the event must be of a kind that
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence; (2) the defendant
alone must have been in possession of the instrumentality which caused
the accident; (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff; (4) the evidence as to
the true explanation of the event must be more readily accessible to the
defendant than to the plaintiff.
The Law Prior to 1964
Reviewing the state of the law before 1964, it is found that in some
states the doctrine did not apply to medical malpractice cases, because
medicine was not thought of as an exact science and many of the re-
sponses of the human body to treatment and surgery are only poorly
understood.9 Other jurisdictions allowed the application of the doctrine
* M.D., Univ. of Vienna (Austria, 1950); Diplomate, American Board of Ophthal-
mology (1963); Assistant Professor of Ophthalmology at Western Reserve Univ.
(1959-1965); practicing physician in Cleveland, Ohio.
1 Mills, Res Ipsa Loquitur and the Calculated Risk in Medical Malpractice, 30 So.
Cal. L. Rev. 80 (1956).
2 Patrick v. Sedwick, 391 P. 2d 453 (Alaska, 1964).
3 Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 62 Cal. Rptr. 154, 397 P. 2d 161 (1965); Tomei v.
Henning, 62 Cal. Rptr. 9, 431 P. 2d 633 (1967).
4 Herbert v. Travelers Indem. Co., 193 So. 2d 330 (La. App. 1966).
5 Mayor v. Dowsett, 240 Ore. 196, 400 P. 2d 234 (1965).
6 Beaudoin v. Watertown Memorial Hosp., 32 Wisc. 2d 132, 145 N.W. 2d 166 (1966).
7 Prosser, Law of Torts, 217 (1964 3d ed.)
8 George v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 34 Ark. 613 (1879).
9 82 A.L.R. 2d 1269 (1962); 70 C.J.S. 994 (1951); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ.
Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P. 2d 170 (1957); Dodson v. Pohle, 73 Ariz.
186, 239 P. 2d 591 (1952); Adams v. Heffington, 216 Ark. 534, 226 S.W. 2d 352 (1950);
McDermott v. St. Mary's Hosp. Corp., 144 Conn. 417, 133 A. 2d 608 (1957); Johnston
v. Rodis, 151 F. Supp. 345 (D.D.C. 1957); Merker v. Wood, 307 Ky. 331 210 S.W. 2d
946 (1948); Bettigole v. Diener, 210 Md. 537, 124 A. 2d 265 (1956); Lane v. Calvert,
215 Md. 457, 138 A. 2d 902 (1958); Thompson v. Lillehei, 164 F. Supp. 716 (D. Minn.
1958); Williams v. Chamberlain, 316 S.W. 2d 505 (Mo. 1958); Shockley v. Payne, 348
S.W. 2d 775 (Tex. App. 1961); Bell v. Umstattd, 401 S.W. 2d 306 (Tex. App. 1966).
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only if it was a matter of common knowledge among laymen that the
patient's injury ordinarily would not have occurred without negligence
on someone's part.'0 When expert testimony was required to establish
the defendant's negligence, however, instructions on res ipsa loquitur
to the jury were usually refused, because the facts were beyond the
knowledge of the layman." California, though, reversed its stand on
this point and did not hesitate to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
even if the jury had to weigh medical expert testimony.' 2 Yet the bur-
den of proof has remained upon the plaintiff to establish every fact
necessary to constitute his cause of action.13
The procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur instructions was to permit
an inference of negligence. This placed the burden of exculpation upon
the defendant physician, because he was the only one who had knowl-
edge of all events during treatment or surgery. The plaintiff was helpless
when asked to come forward with specific proof of negligence, because
he is ignorant of medical technique and frequently rendered uncon-
scious as in the case of surgery. Add to this situation the notorious
reluctance of physicians to testify in court and it is easy to see why the
plaintiff was frequently unable to meet the burden of proof.
1 4
The defendant was required to balance the plaintiff's evidence by
showing that he met the standards of medical care and skill that prevail
in the community, or that other equally probable reasons may have
caused the injury. If he satisfied this requirement, some jurisdictions
took the case away from the jury because it was only a matter of specu-
lation which one of two or more agencies was the proximate cause of the
injury. 15
10 Tiller v. Von Pohie, 72 Ariz. 11, 230 P. 2d 213 (1951); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.
2d 486, 154 P. 2d 687 (1944); Bower v. Olch, 120 Cal. App. 2d 108, 260 P. 2d 997 (1953);
Ambrosi v. Monks, 85 A. 2d 188 (D.C. 1951); Johnston v. Rodis, supra note 9; Swan-
son v. Hill, 166 F. Supp. 296 (D.N.D. 1958); Frost v. Des Moines Still College of
Osteopathy and Surgery, 248 Iowa 294, 79 N.W. 2d 306 (1956); Merker v. Wood, supra
note 9; Sanders v. Smith, 200 Miss. 551, 27 So. 2d 889 (1946); Williams v. Chamber-
lain, supra note 9; Vonault v. O'Rourke, 97 Mt. 92, 33 P. 2d 535 (1934); Ayers v.
Perry, 192 F. 2d 181 (3rd Cir. 1951); Terhune v. Margaret Hague Maternity Hosp.,
63 N.J.S. 106, 164 A. 2d 75 (1960); Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E. 2d 508(1957); Robinson v. Wirts, 387 Pa. 291, 127 A. 2d 706 (1956); Donaldson v. Maffucci,
397 Pa. 548, 156 A. 2d 835 (1959); Meadows v. Patterson, 21 Tenn. App. 283, 109 S.W.
417 (1937); Johnson v. Ely, 30 Tenn. App. 294, 205 S.W. 2d 759 (1947); Olson v.
Weitz, 37 Wash. 2d 70, 221 P. 2d 537 (1950); Nelson v. Murphy, 42 Wash. 2d 737, 258
P. 2d 472 (1953); Smith v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 44 Wash. 2d 202, 266
P. 2d 792 (1954); Richison v. Nunn, 57 Wash. 2d 1, 340 P. 2d 793 (1959).
11 Wallstedt v. Swedish Hosp., 220 Minn. 274, 19 N.W. 2d 426 (1945); Donaldson v.
Maflucci, supra note 10; Fehrman v. Smirl, 20 Wis. 2d 1, 121 N.W. 255 (1963).
12 Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P. 2d 915 (1955).
13 Watterson v. Conwell, 258 Ala. 180, 61 So. 2d 690 (1952); Christian v. Wilmington
General Hosp. Assoc., 50 Del. 550, 135 A. 2d 727 (1957); DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del.
539, 173 A. 2d 333 (1961); Bruce v. U.S., 167 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Quick v.
Thurston, 290 F. 2d 360 (D.D.C. 1961); Cummins v. Donley, 173 Kan. 463, 249 P. 2d
695 (1952); Bettigole v. Diener, supra note 9; Lane v. Calvert, supra note 9; Robin-
(Continued on next page)
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Generally, however, the physician was not looked upon as an in-
surer of a cure or of favorable results, nor was he liable for an honest
mistake in diagnosis or treatment.'"
Post 1964 Decisions
This state of the law was disturbed by an Alaska case in 1964.17
While removing the plaintiff's diseased thyroid gland the surgeon injured
the nerve that serves the vocal cords. This changed the soft, feminine
quality of the patient's voice into a harsh rasping one and reduced her
breathing capacity considerably. The plaintiff's counsel showed that the
operative report did not mention that part of the procedure that involved
the injured nerve. The defendant was unable to recall any irregularities
during surgery and asserted that he had used proper care throughout
the operation. Moreover he introduced evidence that this type of injury
is a risk inherent in surgery of this kind and occurs in up to 5% of these
cases even when the proper degree of skill and care had been observed.
The trial court denied the plaintiff's request to give res ipsa loquitur
instructions to the jury because the underlying questions were not
within the common knowledge of the layman. The defendant won in the
lower court.
The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the judgment of the trial
court, holding that a statistically known calculated risk of 5% nerve
damage does not rule out negligence. The defendant's conduct was
(Continued from preceding page)
son v. Wirts, supra note 10; Donaldson v. Maffucci, supra note 10; Poor Sisters of St.
Francis v. Long, 190 Tenn. 434, 230 S.W. 2d 659 (1950); Butler v. Molinski, 198 Tenn.
124, 277 S.W. 2d 448 (1955); Devereaux v. Smith, 213 S.W. 2d 170 (Tex. 1948); Marsh
v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P. 2d 1108 (1959).
14 82 A.L.R. 2d 1270 (1962); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, supra
note 9; Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Va. 1960); Thomas v. Lobrano, 76 So.
2d 599 (La. 1954); Madis v. Stellwagen, 38 Wash. 2d 1, 227 P. 2d 445 (1951).
15 Buchanan v. Downing, 74 N.M. 423, 394 P. 2d 269 (1964); Crawford v. County of
Sacramento, 49 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1966).
16 Piper v. Halford, 247 Ala. 530, 25 So. 2d 264 (1946); Harris v. Campbell, 2 Ariz.
App. 351, 409 P. 2d 67 (1965); Adams v. Heffington, supra note 9; Christian v. Wil-
mington, supra note 13; Quick v. Thurston, supra note 13; Hine v. Fox, 89 So. 2d 13
(Fla. 1956); Gebhardt v. McQuillen, 230 Iowa 181, 297 N.W. 301 (1941); Mogensen v.
Hicks, 253 Iowa 139, 110 N.W. 2d 563 (1961); Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.
2d 670 (1960); Voss v. Bridwell, 188 Kan. 643, 364 P. 2d 955 (1961); Lane v. Cal-
vert, supra note 9; Johnson v. Colp, 211 Minn. 245, 300 N.W. 791 (1941); Sanders v.
Smith, supra note 10; Hawkins v. McCain, 239 N.C. 160, 79 S.E. 493 (1954); Hunt v.
Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E. 2d 762 (1955); Buchanan v. Downing, supra note 15;
Modrzynski v. Lust, 55 Ohio L. Abs. 106, 88 N.E. 2d 76 (1949); Robinson v. Wirts,
supra note 10; Donaldson v. Maffucci, supra note 10; Grantham v. Goetz, 401 Pa. 349,
164 A. 2d 225 (1960); Demchuk v. Bralow, 404 Pa. 100, 170 A. 2d 868 (1961); Quinley
v. Cocke, 183 Tenn. 428, 192 S.W. 2d 992 (1946); Gravis v. Physicians and Surgeons
Hosp. of Alice, 415 S.W. 2d 674 (Tex. 1967); Danville Community Hosp. v. Thomp-
son, 186 Va. 746, 43 S.E. 2d 882 (1947); Nelson v. Murphy, supra note 10; Hart v.
Steele, 416 S.W. 927 (Mo. 1967); Herbert v. Travelers Indem. Co., supra note 4;
Bruce v. U.S., supra note 13.
17 Patrick v. Sedwick, supra note 2.
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below the standards of medical practice of his community and the plain-
tiff had established a prima facie case of malpractice. The application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was therefore unnecessary. The written
report of the surgery was considered a self-serving document and worth-
less, because the defendant was the only one present at the operation
and because he himself made the determination that he had used every
precaution.
In the following year the Supreme Court of California decided
Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital.' Here, the anesthesiologist, who had
just put a child to sleep in preparation for a minor eye operation, in-
formed the surgeon that breathing and heart action had stopped, and
asked him to perform open chest heart massage. Being an eye specialist,
the surgeon felt unqualified to open the chest and rushed out of the
operating room to look for assistance. He found a general surgeon who
started the heart to beat again.
In such a situation seconds count. If the brain is without oxygen for
more than three minutes irreversible injury to the nervous system is to
be expected. This was exactly what happened. Brain damage rendered
the child permanently and completely paralyzed, mute and blind.19
Experts testified on both sides during the trial. The plaintiff could
show that the injury was caused by the physician's refusal to promptly
perform open heart massage, and that the eye surgeon's conduct, there-
fore, fell below the medical standards of the community. The defendant
showed that cardiac arrest, though rare, does occur even in the absence
of negligence.
After refusing instructions on res ipsa loquitur to the jury, the trial
court gave judgment for the defendant.
The Supreme Court of California held, however, that res ipsa
loquitur would be applicable, since even laymen understand, that this
type of injury is not commonly encountered as a consequence of eye
surgery in the absence of negligence. The defendant was in exclusive
control of the instrumentalities and circumstances at the critical time.
Now the duty was upon him to balance the plaintiff's evidence and to
show that his negligence was not the causative factor that led to this
tragic result. The case was reversed and remanded. (It was settled out
of court before the second trial.)
Thus a jury composed of laymen was credited with enough under-
standing to weigh complicated medical expert testimony.
In the same year the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in the case of
18 Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., supra note 3.
19 Ibid. The facts in the case indicate that by overlooking two danger signals the
defendant's position was further weakened. The patient had fever on the evening be-
fore surgery and was overexcited immediately before the operation because of in-
adequate sedation which rendered him susceptible to cardiac arrest. There was also
an unexplained erasure on the patient's hospital record correcting the temperature
on the morning of surgery.
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Mayor v. Dowsett.20 Here during childbirth a spinal anesthetic was
given to the patient and shortly afterwards her body was improperly
positioned. She became completely and permanently paralyzed from
the neck down, requiring artificial breathing for many months. She sued
the physician for malpractice. Plaintiff's expert witnesses showed that
in permitting the head to lie lower than her legs during spinal anes-
thesia, the drug ascended in her spinal canal and destroyed the motor
nerves.
The defendant introduced considerable expert testimony showing
that the injury could well have been caused by other conditions or by
aggravation of a pre-existing illness during the stress of childbirth.
The plaintiff asked the trial court to instruct the jury on res ipsa
loquitur. This was refused since the issues were outside the common
knowledge of laymen. The defendant prevailed.
The Supreme Court of Oregon set this judgment aside and re-
manded the case. It was held that the expert testimony on behalf of the
plaintiff showed that this injury was not to be expected when due care
was observed in the administration of the anesthetic. Therefore, the
inference may be allowed that the negligence of the physician caused
the injury because the instrumentality was under his exclusive control.
It was, then, for the jury to decide from the expert testimony whether
it was more probable than not that the injury had been caused by negli-
gence of the defendant physician.2 1
In 1966 the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Herbert v. Traveler's
Indemnity Company.2 2 At the trial it was established that the physician
injured a nerve during spinal anesthesia causing suffering and serious
impairment in the use of one leg.
The patient's expert witness showed that injury to the nerve root
in the administration of spinal anesthesia falls below the professional
standards of the community.
The defendant physician's expert witness testified that even if the
physician exercises proper skill and care injury to spinal nerves does
occasionally occur. The trial judge refused the plaintiff's request to give
the jury instructions on res ipsa loquitur because the issues were beyond
the common knowledge of laymen. Judgment was rendered for the
defendant.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana held, however, that res ipsa
loquitur would indeed be applicable if an untoward event occurs:
It*. where the complaint is not based on the failure to obtain satisfac-
tory results, but is based on the charge that, . . . there occurred some
untoward event, . . . from which there resulted something not ordinarily
20 Mayor v. Dowsett, supra note 5.
21 Ibid.
22 Herbert v. Travelers Indem. Co., supra note 4 at p. 334.
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found to result during such treatment or operation, the physician, .. .
may be required to show that such unusual occurrence did not result
from negligence on his part."
In 1966 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided Beaudoin v. Wa-
tertown Memorial Hospital.23 Shortly after awakening from surgery on
her female organs the patient complained of second degree burns on her
buttocks. The burns caused her suffering and disability for six months
after the operation. She sued the physician for malpractice.
The defendant entered expert testimony tending to prove that the
injury was not due to his negligence but was more probably caused by
an allergy or by diabetes. Defendant also contended that plaintiff had
failed to show exactly when, how, and by what instrumentality the sup-
posed burns had been caused, or whether they were caused by defend-
ant's negligence. The plaintiff's request for jury instructions on res ipsa
loquitur was denied because laymen were not capable to weigh expert
testimony. The plaintiff failed.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed and ordered a new trial,
saying that in certain res ipsa loquitur cases for medical malpractice
plaintiffs will be relieved of the almost impossible onus of having to
identify the precise instrumentality which caused the injury. It decided
that the plaintiff was entitled to res ipsa loquitur instructions because
laymen would be able to conclude as a matter of common knowledge
that second degree burn blisters are not a common occurrence during
this type of procedure if due care is observed. The alternative causes
for the injury suggested by the defendant do not take away the benefit
of res ipsa loquitur. The inference of negligence is left to the jury un-
less the defendant gives undisputable proof that negligence did not
occur.
A recent California decision had similar overtones. 24 By an error in
judgment the surgeon tied off one ureter during a procedure designed to
remove the patient's womb. Serious complications followed requiring
two more major operations and the eventual removal of one kidney.
At the malpractice suit expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff
showed that the tying off of a ureter does not occur when proper care is
applied. The defendant showed that damage to the ureter is a recognized
complication of this type of surgery even in the absence of negligence.
Res ipsa loquitur instructions were refused by the trial court because
the issues were beyond the knowledge of laymen and the defendant won.
The Supreme Court of California held that from this expert testimony
the jurors as reasonable men could have inferred that the injury was
the kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's
23 Beaudoin v. Watertown Memorial Hosp., supra note 6.
24 Tomei v. Henning, supra note 3.
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negligence. This justifies a trial judge to give res ipsa loquitur instruc-
tions to the jury. The case was reversed and remanded.
In these six decisions important developments can be recognized
that may well forecast a future trend in medical malpractice law-
excusable errors of today may amount to actionable negligence to-
morrow.
25
Except for Alaska, these state Supreme Courts decided that the
appearance of expert witnesses should not deprive the plaintiff of the
benefit to try his case to a jury. Henceforth laymen of these states will
be credited with enough knowledge to base a sound verdict upon com-
plex medical facts. What are the reasons for this change in attitude?
Some commentators explain it as an attempt to balance the equities
during trial. It can readily be understood that the plaintiff has a Hercu-
lean task to prove the exact causes that led to his injuries because of his
ignorance of medical technique. Moreover, he is rendered unconscious
during surgery when the critical events occurred.2 6
Thus, the burden of proof is shifted to the defendant physician to
show that he was not negligent or that the injuries were caused by
agencies other than negligence. Surely he has better access to vital
information than anyone else .2  The defendant used to meet this burden
by showing that the injury is statistically recognized as an inherent risk
of surgery. At times he may have been worried by a lack of sympathy
from the lower court, but most appeals courts used to rule that negli-
gence had not been sufficiently proven.2 8 In these recent decisions how-
ever, the appeals courts have remained unimpressed by medical statistics.
They have pierced the fog of professional and scientific mystery by de-
claring that recognized calculated risks: (1) do not exclude negligence
and; (2) do not deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of res ipsa loquitur
instructions to the jury. One cannot help the impression that in at least
two instances the courts showed outright contempt for statistics. 29 They
seemed to interpret them rather as the incidence of culpable conduct
than as events beyond medical control.
The courts are undoubtedly aware of the conflict of interests with
which a physician is faced in the case of an untoward result. On the
one side is his duty to the patient that obliges him to disclose all perti-
nent facts, even if he should incriminate himself. And, on the other side
25 Mills, op. cit. supra note 1.
26 Connor, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 231 (1958); Rubsamen, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Cali-
fornia Malpractice Law-Expansion of a Doctrine to the Bursting Point, 14 Stan. L.
Rev. 251 (1962).
27 Bettigole v. Diener, supra note 9; Lane v. Calvert, supra note 9; Poor Sisters of St.
Francis v. Long, supra note 13; Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 225 La. 618,
73 So. 2d 781 (1953).
28 Cavero v. Franklin, 36 Cal. 2d 301, 223 P. 2d 471 (1950).
29 Patrick v. Sedwick, supra note 2; Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., supra note 3.
May, 1968
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1968
RES IPSA AND MALPRACTICE
is the desire to protect his reputation, his pocketbook, and to stay free
from liability.30
The physician's task of exculpation is made more formidable yet by
outright discrediting all evidence introduced by him. Operative report
and other statements are held to be self-serving and worthless because
he himself had made the determination that every precaution had been
used.3 ' Some jurisdictions feel that this attitude goes against the Anglo-
American tradition of justice and fairness which holds the defendant
innocent until proven guilty. Moreover, there is an unjustifiable threat
to professional reputation involved by offering every disgruntled patient
a fair chance to obtain a judgment against his physician.32 For all prac-
tical purposes this amounts to imposing strict liability upon the medical
profession: with medical statistics being discarded and the defendant's
credibility reduced to the vanishing point, the physician is now supposed
to exculpate himself. 33 How many juries will find that the defendant
had met this burden well enough so as to absolve himself from negli-
gence?
There may be other reasons for this new trend. The justices in three
courts did not hesitate to show that they were deeply moved by the
tragic results.34 Maybe they felt that every patient should be compen-
sated for grievous injuries following surgery regardless of the presence
of negligence. This would amount to regression to the historic attitude
that "in all civil acts, . . . the law doth not so much regard the intent
of the actor, as the loss and damage of the party suffering." 35 To hold
the physician liable where negligence has not been proven amounts to
liability without fault. This concept is not new. "A bona fide purchaser
of stolen goods is held liable for conversion; the publisher of a libel com-
mits a tort, although he has no means of knowing the defamatory nature
of his words." 36
As it is tacitly understood that physicians carry malpractice insur-
ance, these decisions seem to say: Let him carry the financial burden of
disastrous results, who makes a living (and a profit) by performing
those risky operations. This is the concept of the deeper pocket and
sounds much like Workmen's Compensation Law: the financial burden
is shifted to him who can best bear the loss.
30 Louisell and Williams, Res Ipsa Loquitur-It's Future in Medical Malpractice
Cases, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 252 (1960).
31 Patrick v. Sedwick, supra note 2.
32 Mills, op. cit. supra note 1; Louisell, op. cit. supra note 30.
33 Naraghi, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California Malpractice Law: Quintal v. Laurel
Grove Hospital, 18 Hastings L. J. 691 (1967); Rubsamen, op. cit. supra, note 26.
34 Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., supra note 3; Tomei v. Henning, supra note 3;
Mayor v. Dowsett, supra note 5.
35 Prosser, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 506.
36 Id. at 507.
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The physician is then not insured only for conduct that falls below
professional standards in the community, but also for all the inherent
risks in medical practice that are beyond his control. These new de-
cisions make Justice Taft's words of 1897 sound prophetic: ". . . Few
would be courageous enough to practice the healing art, for they would
have to assume financial liability for nearly all the ills that flesh is
heir to." 37
Effect on Medical Profession
What effect will this new trend have upon the practice of medicine?
Some observers feel that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is most appro-
priate to enforce the physician's duty toward his patient.3s But no one
could fail to see the impact of this attitude upon the medical profession
to use only those procedures that pose the least threat of legal liability,
regardless of their relative curative value. The Supreme Court of
California expressed this concern itself in a 1962 decision: "To permit an
inference of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur solely
because an uncommon complication develops would place too great a
burden upon the medical profession and might result in an undesirable
limitation on the use of operations or new procedures involving an
inherent risk of injury even when due care is used." 39
Others suggested that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should not be
applied in cases of medical research, nor when the methods of treatment
are still in a formative state.40 This way it would not thwart medical
advancement or deter doctors from employing new methods. Rulings of
sympathy may become a deterrent to medical practice. Therefore, the
exercise of the medical profession must remain subject to the fewest
restrictions.41
The impact of these new decisions could be compared to the visible
part of an iceberg-their greatest influence will be exerted upon numer-
ous malpractice decisions on the nisi prius level, where they will remain
mostly unnoticed.4 2
Recommendations
These problems are as old as the medical profession. There is little
prospect for a quick solution. This writer believes that the basic diffi-
culty lies in a monumental lack of communication and rapport between
the medical and legal professions. But while the legal profession has
S7 Ewing v. Goode, 78 F. 442 (6th Cir. 1897).
38 Louisell, op. cit. supra note 30; Naraghi, op. cit. supra note 33.
39 Siverson v. Weber, 57 Cal. 2d 834, 372 P. 2d 97 (1962) at 99.
40 Connor, op. cit. supra note 26.
41 Mills, op. cit. supra note 1.
42 Miller, Will You Be Held Liable for Bad Results?, Medical Economics, Nov. 13,
1967, at 66.
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gone a long way to remedy the situation by acquiring medical knowledge
as it applies to malpractice law, the medical profession has remained
rather indifferent to the legal problems of their patients.
It is suggested that this inter-professional hiatus could be narrowed
by the following steps:
1. Introduction of medico-legal courses into medical school curricula
would point out to the future physicians that the duties to the patient
do not end in the office or at the bedside in the hospital, but that there
are legal aspects to their future work and that they have a duty to dis-
close to the patient who has been injured in the course of treatment or
surgery, just what had happened and that this patient's rights can only
be protected by the physician's willingness to co-operate with the legal
process.
2. Qualified lawyers should offer themselves as speakers at the
regular meetings of county medical societies to make physicians aware
of their part in protecting a patient's rights.
3. Medical societies should be urged to establish panels of impartial
medical experts who are willing to testify in malpractice cases in order
to promote the administration of justice. This would free the medical
profession of the stigma that the "conspiracy of silence" had cast upon it.
4. The attitude that local differences in medical practice could be
prejudicial to the parties of malpractice litigations is rather antiquated
and should be abandoned. There is nothing revolutionary about this
suggestion: all specialists, e.g., after meeting nationally uniform re-
quirements, are certified before national boards which are composed of
eminent physicians from all parts of the country. Presently the local
variations of medical practice in the United States are in most cases
negligible and out-of-town experts could be invited to testify.
This is of great practical importance: in the same community there
is always fear of economic and social retaliation since the physicians
are interdependent. The atmosphere of anonymity created by out-of-
town witnesses would avoid friction on the local level and enhance their
willingness to testify against a colleague in order to help an injured
patient.
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol17/iss2/5
